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Abstract. A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme supports the delega-
tion of decryption rights via a proxy, who makes the ciphertexts de-
cryptable by the delegatee. PRE is useful in various applications such
as encrypted email forwarding. In this paper, we introduce a more gen-
eralized notion of conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption (CPBRE).
A CPBRE scheme allows Alice to generate a re-encryption key for some
condition speciﬁed during the encryption, such that the re-encryption
power of the proxy is restricted to that condition only. This enables a
more ﬁne-grained delegation of decryption right. Moreover, Alice can
delegate decryption rights to a set of users at a time. That is, Alice’s
ciphertexts can be re-broadcasted. This saves a lot of computation and
communication cost. We propose a basic CPBRE scheme secure against
chosen-plaintext attacks, and its extension which is secure against re-
playable chosen-ciphertext attacks (RCCA). Both schemes are unidirec-
tional and proved secure in the standard model. Finally, we show that
it is easy to get a unidirectional RCCA-secure identity-based proxy re-
encryption from our RCCA-secure CPBRE construction.
Keywords: proxy re-encryption, conditional proxy re-encryption, broad-
cast encryption, hierarchical identity-coupling broadcast encryption.
1 Introduction
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes enable (by delegating a transformation-key
to) a semi-trusted proxy to transform Alice’s ciphertext into one encrypting the
same message which is decryptable by Bob, without allowing the proxy any abil-
ity to perform tasks outside of the delegation. PRE found applications [3,8] in
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digital rights management, distributed ﬁle storage systems, and email forward-
ing. For example, users can assign their email server as the proxy such that it
can re-encrypt the emails for diﬀerent users without knowing the email content.
Although PRE is useful in many applications, we found that sometimes we
need more than the basic. In corporate email forwarding, Alice may ask the proxy
to re-encrypt her emails to her colleague Bob when she is on leave. However, this
is not enough in the following scenarios:
1. Alice does not want Bob to read all her private emails.
2. For some business emails, Alice has to forward them to more than one col-
league other than Bob, in an extreme case, the whole staﬀ of the company.
Using a traditional PRE, a proxy is too powerful as it has the ability to re-
encrypt all Alice’s emails to Bob once the re-encryption key is given. For more
than one delegatees, Alice needs to generate a re-encryption key for each staﬀ
member, and the proxy also needs to re-encrypt emails for each of them.
We believe there is a better way to handle these situations. We envision a
more generalized notion of Conditional Proxy Broadcast Re-Encryption (CP-
BRE). Alice can specify a condition to generate a conditional re-encryption key,
such that the re-encryption power of the proxy is restricted to that condition
only. Moreover, Alice can delegate the decryption rights to a set of users at a
time, which means Alice’s ciphertexts can be re-broadcasted. In this paper, we
formalize this notion, propose a basic CPBRE scheme secure against chosen-
plaintext attacks (CPA), and an extension that is secure against replayable
chosen-ciphertext attacks (RCCA) [9]. RCCA is a weaker variant of chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA) in which a harmless mauling of the challenge ciphertext
is tolerated. Both schemes are unidirectional and secure in the standard model.
The new CPBRE is much more ﬂexible. Back to our email-forwarding ex-
ample, Alice can use the keywords “business”, “private” and “golf” as the con-
ditions, to allow forwarding of her encrypted emails to her colleagues, family
members, and golf club members respectively. For each group, Alice only re-
quires to produce one re-encryption key and the proxy only requires to transform
a single ciphertext. This saves a lot of computation and communication cost.
Finally, being a generalization of PRE, it is easy to use our RCCA-secure CP-
BRE construction to build a RCCA-secure unidirectional identity-based proxy
re-encryption (IB-PRE), which is the ﬁrst of its kind.
1.1 Related Works
Following Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss’s seminal work [3] which presented a bidi-
rectional CPA-secure PRE scheme, many PRE schemes have been proposed.
Ateniese et al. [1] presented a CPA-secure unidirectional PRE. Canetti and
Hohenberger [8] presented a CCA-secure bidirectional PRE. Later, Libert and
Vergnaud [14] presented a RCCA-secure unidirectional PRE. These PRE schemes
[1,8,14] rely on the somewhat costly bilinear pairings. Without pairings, Deng et
al. [11] proposed a CCA-secure bidirectional PRE. Subsequently, Weng et al. [19]
and Shao and Cao [16] presented CCA-secure unidirectional PRE.
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Proxy re-encryption has also been studied in identity-based encryption (IBE)
settings. Based on Boneh-Boyen IBE [4], Boneh, Goh and Matsuo [6] described
a hybrid proxy re-encryption system. Green and Ateniese [12] presented a CPA-
secure IB-PRE and a CCA-secure IB-PRE, which are proven in the random
oracle model and only support single-use (i.e., the ciphertext can only be re-
encrypted once). Matsuo [15] also proposed a CPA-secure IB-PRE scheme. Later,
Chu and Tzeng [10] tried to propose a CCA-secure multi-use IB-PRE scheme
without random oracles. However, as Shao and Cao [16] stated, [12,10] are unable
to resist a “chain collusion attack” (described later). Up to now, there is still no
CCA-secure (or RCCA-secure) IB-PRE scheme in the standard model.
Tang [17] introduced the primitive of type-based proxy re-encryption, which
allows the proxy to re-encrypt a speciﬁc type of delegator’s ciphertexts. Inde-
pendently, Weng et al. [18] introduced a similar primitive named “conditional
proxy re-encryption”, in which the proxy can re-encrypt a ciphertext under a
speciﬁc condition iﬀ he has the re-encryption key with respect to this condition.
However, both of these schemes are proved in the random oracle model. Finally,
Libert and Vergnaud [13] introduced the notion of traceable proxy re-encryption,
where malicious proxies leaking their re-encryption keys can be identiﬁed.
2 Definition
We brieﬂy describe the assumptions and underlying encryption schemes that
will be used in our constructions, then the deﬁnition of CPBRE will be given.
2.1 Pairing and Related Computational Assumption
Let G and GT be two (multiplicatively) cyclic groups of prime order p. Let
e : G×G → GT is a map with the following properties:
– Bilinear: for all g1, g2 ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab.
– Non-degenerate: for some g ∈ G, e(g, g) = 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and GT , and the
bilinear map are eﬃciently computable.
Our schemes are based on the Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Exponent
(BDHE) problem in (G,GT ) [5] – given 2n + 1 elements
(g˜, g, gα, gα
2
, . . . , gα
n
, gα
n+2
, . . . , gα
2n
) ∈ G2n+1,
and an element R ∈ GT , decide if R = e(g, g˜)αn+1 .
In the rest of this paper, we will use gi to denote the term gα
i
.
Definition 1. The Decisional n-BDHE assumption holds in (G,GT ) if no poly-
nomial time algorithm A has non-negligible advantage in solving the Decisional
n-BDHE problem in (G,GT ), where the advantage of A is ε if
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
Pr[A(g˜, g, g1, g2, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, e(gn+1, g˜)) = 1]
− Pr[A(g˜, g, g1, g2, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, R) = 1]
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≥ ε.
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2.2 Hierarchical Identity-Coupling Broadcast Encryption
Attrapadung, Furukawa and Imai [2] proposed a notion of Hierarchical Identity-
Coupling Broadcast Encryption (HICBE). We review its model and security
deﬁnition here. For an identity ID = {id1, id2, . . . , idl}, we denote IDj as
{id1, id2, . . . , idj} for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. An HICBE consists of the following algorithms.
– Setup(n): on input the maximum number of users, output the public key
PK and master secret key MK.
– KeyGen(PK,MK, i): on input the public key PK, the master secret key
MK and an index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, output the root secret key ski of user i.
– Derive(PK, ski,IDl−1 , i, ID): on input the public key PK, the secret key
ski,IDl−1 of user i coupling with the (l − 1)-level identity IDl−1, an index
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and an l-level identity ID, output the secret key ski,ID.
– Encrypt(PK,S, ID,m): on input the public key PK, an index set S ⊆
{1, 2, . . . , n}, an identity ID and a message m, output the ciphertext C.
– Decrypt(PK, ski,ID , i, S, ID,C): on input the public key PK, the secret
key ski,ID, an index i, a set S, an identity ID and a ciphertext C, output
the plaintext m.
The selective identity-and-set security of HICBE is deﬁned by the following
game between an adversary A and a challenger. Both are given n as input.
1. Init. A picks a set S∗ ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and an identity ID∗ to be attacked.
2. Setup. Perform Setup(n) to get (PK,MK) and give PK to A.
3. Query phase 1. A can issue the following queries:
– Extract(i, ID): if i /∈ S∗ or ID is not a preﬁx of ID∗ or ID∗ itself, return
ski,ID ← Derive(PK, ski, i, ID) where ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i);
otherwise, return ‘⊥’.
– Decrypt(i, S, ID,C): return m ← Decrypt(PK, ski,ID, i, S, ID,C),
where ski,ID ← Derive(PK, ski, i, ID), ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i).
4. Challenge. A presents (m0,m1). Return C∗ ← Encrypt(PK,S∗, ID∗,mb)
to A, where b ∈R {0, 1}.
5. Query phase 2. A continues making queries as in Query phase 1 except that
A cannot issue the decryption query on (i, S∗, ID,C∗) such that i ∈ S∗ and
(ID = ID∗ or ID is a preﬁx of ID∗).
6. Guess. A outputs the guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
We say A wins the game if b′ = b. The advantage of A is deﬁned as |Pr[b′ =
b]− 12 |. An HICBE scheme is IND-sID-sSet-CCA-secure if for any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A, the advantage of A in this game is negligible. The
CPA security is deﬁned in the same way as CCA security except that A is not
allowed to issue the decryption queries.
Attrapadung, Furukawa and Imai provided two constructions based on BGW
[5] broadcast encryption. In this paper, we use the HICBE based on BB-IBE [4]
to build our CPBRE constructions. The security of this HICBE can be asserted
by the following theorem, details can be found in [7] and the full version of [2].
Theorem 1. Suppose theDecisionaln-BDHEassumptionholds.The (BGW+BB)
HICBE scheme for n users is IND-sID-sSet-CCA-secure.
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2.3 Conditional Proxy Broadcast Re-Encryption
We deﬁne our new notion of conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption as follows.
Definition 2. A conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption scheme consists of
the following algorithms:
– Setup(n): used for the generation of the system public key and master secret
key of n users. On input the maximum number of users, output the public
key PK and master secret key MK.
– KeyGen(PK,MK, i): used for the generation of user i’s secret key. On
input the public key PK, the master secret key MK and an index i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, output the secret key ski.
– Encrypt(PK,S,w,m): used for the generation of a regular ciphertext of m
for the set S under condition w. On input the public key PK, an index set
S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, a condition w and a message m, output the ciphertext C.
– RKGen(PK, ski, S′, w): used for the generation of a re-encryption key from
i to S′ under condition w. On input the public key PK, the secret key ski,
an index set S′ and a condition w, output the re-encryption key di→S′|w.
– ReEnc(PK, di→S′|w, i, S, S′, w, C): used for the generation of a re-encrypted
ciphertext from C. On input the public key PK, the re-encryption key di→S′|w,
the original recipient i, the original set S, the new set S′, the condition w and
a ciphertext C, output the re-encrypted ciphertext CR or ‘⊥’.
– Decrypt-I(PK, ski, i, S, w,C): used for the decryption of the regular cipher-
text C. On input the public key PK, the secret key ski, an index i, a set S,
a condition w and a ciphertext C, output the plaintext m or ‘⊥’.
– Decrypt-II(PK, ski′ , i, i′, S, S′, w, CR): used for the decryption of the re-
encrypted ciphertext CR. On input the public key PK, the delegatee’s secret
key ski′ , two indices i and i′, two sets S and S′, a condition w and a re-
encrypted ciphertext CR, output the plaintext m or ‘⊥’.
Correctness. For any integer n, any sets S and S′, any indices i ∈ S and
i′ ∈ S′, any condition w and any message m,
Pr
[
Decrypt-I(PK, ski, i, S, w,C) = m : (PK,MK)← Setup(n),
ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i), C ← Encrypt(PK,S,w,m)
]
= 1,
Pr
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Decrypt-II(PK, ski′ , i, i′, S, S′, w, CR) = m :
(PK,MK)← Setup(n), ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i),
ski′ ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i′), di←S′|w ← RKGen(PK, ski, S′, w),
C ← Encrypt(PK,S,w,m), CR ← ReEnc(PK, di←S′|w, i, S, S′, w, C)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
=1.
Now, we proceed to deﬁne the security model for CPBRE. Here we consider
the security in the replayable CCA sense [9,8,14]. For traditional public key
cryptosystems, in such a relaxed security notion, an adversary who can simply
modify a given ciphertext into another encryption of the same plaintext is not
deemed successful [14]. To deﬁne the RCCA security for CPBRE systems, we
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here disallow the adversary to ask for a decryption of any re-randomized version
of the -encrypted ciphertext re-encrypted from the challenge ciphertext.
Definition 3. The chosen-ciphertext security of a CPBRE scheme against a
static adversary is defined by the following game between an adversary A and a
challenger. Both the challenger and A are given n as input.
1. Init. A chooses a set S∗ ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and a condition w∗ that it wants to
attack.
2. Setup. Perform Setup(n) to get (PK,MK) and give PK to A.
3. Query phase 1. We define the following oracles.
(a) Extract(i): return ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i).
(b) RKExtract(i, S′, w): return di→S′|w ← RKGen(PK, ski, S′, w), where
ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i).
(c) ReEncrypt(i, S, S′, w, C): returnCR ← ReEnc(PK, di→S′|w, C), where
di→S′|w ← RKGen(PK, ski, S′, w) and ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i).
(d) Decrypt-I(i, S, w,C): return m ← Decrypt-I(PK, ski, i, S, w,C),
where ski ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i).
(e) Decrypt-II(i, i′, S, S′, w, CR): compute ski′ ← KeyGen(PK,MK, i′)
and return m ← Decrypt-II(PK, ski′ , i, i′, S, S′, w, CR).
A can issue these queries except
– Extract(i) for any i ∈ S∗ and
– both RKExtract(i, S′, w∗) and Extract(i′) for any S′, i ∈ S∗ and
i′ ∈ S′.
4. Challenge. A presents (m0,m1). Return C∗ = Encrypt(PK,S∗, w∗,mb) to
A, where b ∈R {0, 1}.
5. Query phase 2. A continues making queries as in the Query phase 1, except
for the following queries
– Extract(i) for any i ∈ S∗;
– RKExtract(i, S′, w∗) and Extract(i′) for any S′, i ∈ S∗ and i′ ∈ S′;
– Decrypt-I(i, S∗, w∗, C∗) for any i ∈ S∗;
– ReEncrypt(i, S′, w∗, C∗) and Extract(i′) for any S′, i ∈ S∗ and
i′ ∈ S′;
– Decrypt-II(i, i′, S∗, S′, w∗, C∗R) for any S
′ and C∗R, where i ∈ S∗, i′ ∈
S′ and
Decrypt-II(PK, ski′ , i, i′, S∗, S′, w∗, C∗R) ∈ {m0,m1}.
6. Guess. A outputs the guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. We say A wins the game if b′ = b.
The advantage of A is defined as |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |. A CPBRE scheme is IND-
sCond-sSet-RCCA-secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A,
the advantage of A in this game is negligible. The CPA security is defined in the
same way as RCCA security except that A is not allowed to query ReEncrypt,
Decrypt-I and Decrypt-II oracles, similar to the definition in [12].
3 CPA-Secure CPBRE
We start by presenting a CPA version of our ﬁnal scheme. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume a condition is always speciﬁed for every encryption.
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3.1 Construction
The basic CPBRE scheme is described as follows.
– Setup(n). Pick a prime p and generates groups G,GT , bilinear map e and
a generator g as deﬁned in Section 2.1. Randomly choose α, γ ∈R Zp and
compute gi = gα
i ∈ G for i = 1, . . . , n, n + 2, . . . , 2n. Deﬁne the function
F (x) = gx1h, where h ∈R G. Let H ′ : GT → G be a target collision resistant
(TCR) hash. Compute v = gγ . Output the public/secret key:
PK = (v, g, g1, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, F,H ′), MK = γ.
– KeyGen(PK,MK, i). The private key for i is deﬁned as
ski = g
γ
i .
– Encrypt(PK,S,w,m). For the set S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and the condition w ∈
Zp, pick t ∈R Zp, the ciphertext for message m ∈ GT is output as
C = (c1, c2, c3, c4) = (m · e(g1, gn)t, gt, (v ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)t, F (w)t).
– RKGen(PK, ski, S′, w). Randomly choose s ∈ Zp, output
di→S′|w = (ski · F (w)s, C′), where C′ ← Encrypt’(PK,S′, gs),
where the algorithm Encrypt’(PK,S,m) for S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and m ∈ G
picks t ∈R Zp, σ ∈R GT and outputs the ciphertext as
C′ = (c′0, c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3) = (m ·H ′(σ), σ · e(g1, gn)t, gt, (v ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)t).
– ReEnc(PK, di→S′|w, i, S, S′, w, C). Let C = (c1, c2, c3, c4) and di→S′|w =
(d, C′). Compute
c˜1 = c1 · e(d ·
∏
j∈S,j =i
gn+1−j+i, c2)/e(gi, c3) and c˜2 = c4.
The re-encrypted ciphertext is output as
CR = (c˜1, c˜2, C′).
– Decrypt-I(PK, ski, i, S, w,C). Let C = (c1, c2, c3, c4). Output
m = c1 · e(ski ·
∏
j∈S,j =i
gn+1−j+i, c2)/e(gi, c3).
– Decrypt-II(PK, ski′ , i, i′, S, S′, w, CR). Let CR = (c˜1, c˜2, C′) and C′ =
(c′0, c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3). Recover
gs ← c′0/H ′(c′1 ·
e(ski′ ·
∏
j∈S′,j =i′ gn+1−j+i′ , c
′
2)
e(gi′ , c′3)
)
and output
m = c˜1/e(gs, c˜2).
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Discussion. For the regular encryption, the scheme is just the same as the un-
derlying BGW+BB HICBE scheme, hence we enjoy a constant-size ciphertext.
For the re-encryption key under condition w, we encrypt gs, one of the two ele-
ments of ski,w, under the key of the recipient set. Again, its size is independent
of the number of delegatees. The same hold trues for re-encrypted ciphertext.
The regular decryption procedure is proceeded in ReEnc, except for the can-
cellation of the term e(gs, f(w)t). In Decrypt-II, the recipient can decrypt C′
to get gs ﬁrst, and then cancel e(gs, f(w)t) to get m.
Correctness. For any integer n, any sets S and S′, any indices i ∈ S and i′ ∈ S′,
any condition w and any message m, we can see that
– for Decrypt-I,
c1 · e(ski ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, c2)/e(gi, c3)
= c1 · e(gγi ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, g
t)/e(gi, (v ·
∏
j∈S gn+1−j)
t)
= c1 · e(
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, g
t)/e(gi,
∏
j∈S g
t
n+1−j)
= c1/e(g, gtn+1) = m · e(g1, gn)t/e(g, gtn+1) = m;
– for Decrypt-II,
c˜1/e(gs, c˜2)
= (c1 · e(d ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, c2)/e(gi, c3))/e(g
s, c4)
= (c1 · e(ski · F (w)s ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, c2)/e(gi, c3))/e(g
s, c4)
= (c1 · e(ski ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, c2)/e(gi, c3))e(F (w)
s, c2)/e(gs, c4)
= m · e(F (w)s, gt)/e(gs, F (w)t) (via Decrypt-I)
= m.
3.2 Security
Theorem 2. Suppose the decisional n-BDHE assumption holds and H ′ is a
TCR hash function, the basic CPBRE scheme for n users described above is
IND-sCond-sSet-CPA-secure.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A breaking our basic CPBRE scheme with
non-negligible advantage. Initially, A outputs a selected set S∗ and a selected
condition w∗. Then we construct another algorithm B breaking the underlying
HICBE scheme as follows.
Given the public key PK of HICBE, B simulates the security game of basic
CPBRE. Initially, B prepares two tables:
– EX with an index list: a track of Extract queries.
– RK with columns (i, S′, w, d): d is the re-encryption key from index i to the
set S′ under the condition w.
Moreover, we use ∗ to denote the wildcard symbol.
1. Init. B outputs S∗ and w∗ as the target set and target identity of HICBE.
2. Setup. Choose a TCR hash function H ′. B sends PK along with H ′ to A.
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3. Query phase 1. B answers the following queries issued by A:
(a) Extract(i): if i ∈ S∗, or (j, S′, w∗, ∗) exists in the RK table, where
j ∈ S∗, i ∈ S′, B responds ‘⊥’. Otherwise, B forwards the query to the
key extraction oracle of HICBE, and responds the received ski. B records
i in the EX table.
(b) RKExtract(i, S′, w): if there is a tuple (i, S′, w, di→S′|w) in the RK
table, B responds di→S′|w to A. Otherwise, we have the following cases:
– i /∈ S∗ or w = w∗: B queries i’s secret key under identity w from
the challenger of HICBE, and responds the re-encryption key as the
real scheme (except that gs is given by the challenger). B records the
tuple (i, S′, w, di→S′|w) in the RK table.
– i ∈ S∗, w = w∗ and S′ ∩ EX = ∅: B responds ‘⊥’.
– i ∈ S∗ and w = w∗, but S′∩EX = ∅: B picks d, d′ ∈R G and responds
a random re-encryption key di→S′|w = (d,Encrypt’(PK,S′, d′)). B
records the tuple (i, S′, w, di→S′|w) in the RK table.
4. Challenge. A sends (m0,m1) to B. B forwards it to the challenger of HICBE.
When the challenger returns ciphertext C∗, B responds C∗ to A.
5. Query phase 2. B responds A’s queries as in phase 1.
6. Guess. When A outputs the guess b′, B outputs b′.
We can see that B successfully simulates A’s view in the attack except for a
case of re-encryption key queries (when i ∈ S∗ and w = w∗). For a randomly
chosen key di→S′|w = (d, C′), there must be a value s′ ∈ Zp such that d =
ski · F (w)s′ . Therefore the problem is equivalent to the indistinguishability of
C′ and the encryption of some value gs
′
. This is implied by the CPA security
of HICBE and the TCR hash function. So, B has non-negligible advantage in
breaking the HICBE scheme. By Theorem 1, B has non-negligible advantage in
breaking the decisional n-BDHE assumption. 
Note that our constructions can withstand the below attack mentioned in [16].
Chain collusion attack. Suppose Alice is the attack target in a proxy re-encryption
scheme. Although the adversaryA cannot get the re-encryption key from Alice to
Bob and Bob’s private key at the same time,A can get the re-encryption key from
Bob to Carol and Carol’s private key instead. If Bob’s private key can be derived
with these two keys, then Alice’s private key can be derived as well by just asking
for the re-encryption key from Alice to Bob.
In our constructions, we assume a condition w for each encryption. It means all
re-encryption keys given to the proxy are coupled with a condition. The collusion
of the proxy and the delegatee can recover the decryption key for some condition
only. However, the ciphertext C′ in the re-encryption key can be decrypted by
the root private key only. So the above attack cannot be applied.
4 RCCA-Secure CPBRE
The RCCA-secure CPBRE scheme follows the structure of the basic CPBRE.
However, it is challenging to design a RCCA-secure CPBRE scheme because it
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involves two kinds of secret keys (regular decryption keys and re-encryption keys)
and two kinds of ciphertexts (regular ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts).
Again, we assume a condition is always speciﬁed for every encryption.
4.1 Construction
– Setup(n). Pick a prime p and generates groups G,GT , bilinear map e and
a generator g. Randomly choose α, γ ∈R Zp and compute gi = gαi ∈ G for
i = 1, . . . , n, n+2, . . . , 2n. Deﬁne the functions bit(i, x) be the i-th bit of a bit-
string x, F1(x) = gx1h1 and F2(x) = u
′∏ uibit(i,x) where h1, u, u1, · · · , uη ∈R
G Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and H ′ : GT → G be two TCR hash functions.
Compute v = gγ . Output the public key and the secret key:
PK = (v, g, g1, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, F1, F2, H,H ′), MK = γ.
– KeyGen(PK,MK, i). The private key for i is deﬁned as
ski = g
γ
i .
– Encrypt(PK,S,w,m). For the set S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and the condition w ∈
Zp, the ciphertext for message m ∈ GT can be output as
C = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) = (m · e(g1, gn)t, gt, (v ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)t, F1(w)t, F2(h)t),
where t ∈R Zp and h = H(c1, c2, c3, c4).
– RKGen(PK, ski, S′, w). Pick s ∈R Zp. Output the re-encryption key as
di→S′|w = (ski · F1(w)s, C′), where C′ ← Encrypt’(PK,S′, gs).
The algorithmEncrypt’(PK,S,m) for S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and m ∈ G outputs
C′ = (c′0, c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4) = (m·H ′(σ), σ ·e(g1, gn)t, gt, (v ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)t, F2(h′)t),
where t ∈R Zp, σ ∈R GT and h′ = H(c′0, c′1, c′2, c′3).
– ReEnc(PK, di→S′|w, i, S, S′, w, C). Let C = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and di→S′|w =
(d, C′). Compute h = H(c1, c2, c3, c4). Check that
e(c2, v ·
∏
j∈S gn+1−j)
?=e(g, c3), e(c2, F2(h))
?=e(g, c5), e(c2, F1(w))
?=e(g, c4).
If any of the equations does not hold or i /∈ S, output ‘⊥’. Otherwise,
compute
d′1 = d · F2(h)s
′
, and d′2 = g
s′ .
Output the re-encrypted ciphertext
CR = (C,C′, d′1, d
′
2).
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– Decrypt-I(PK, ski, i, S, w,C). Let C = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5). Compute h =
H(c1, c2, c3, c4) and check that
e(c2, v ·
∏
j∈S gn+1−j)
?=e(g, c3), e(c2, F2(h))
?=e(g, c5), e(c2, F1(w))
?=e(g, c4).
If any of the equations does not hold or i /∈ S, output ‘⊥’. Otherwise, output
m = c1 ·
e(ski ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, c2)
e(gi, c3)
.
– Decrypt-II(PK, ski′ , i, i′, S, S′, w, CR). Let CR = (C,C′, d′1, d
′
2) where C =
(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and C′ = (c′0, c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4). Compute h = H(c1, c2, c3, c4)
and h′ = H(c′0, c′1, c′2, c′3). Check that
e(c2, v ·
∏
j∈S gn+1−j)
?= e(g, c3), e(c′2, v ·
∏
j∈S′ gn+1−j)
?= e(g, c′3)
e(c2, F1(w))
?= e(g, c4), e(c2, F2(h))
?= e(g, c5),
e(c′2, F2(h
′)) ?= e(g, c′4) and i ∈ S.
(1)
If any of the equations does not hold, output ‘⊥’. Otherwise, perform
gs = c′0/H
′(c′1 ·
e(ski′ ·
∏
j∈S′,j =i′ gn+1−j+i′ , c
′
2)
e(gi′ , c′3)
).
and check that
e(d′1, g)
?= e(gi, v)e(F1(w), gs)e(F2(h), d′2). (2)
If the equation does not hold, output ‘⊥’. Otherwise output
m = c1 ·
e(d′1 ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, c2)
e(gi, c3)e(gs, c4)e(d′2, c5)
.
Correctness. The decryption of regular ciphertexts is just the same as our basic
CPBRE. For the re-encrypted ciphertexts, we ﬁrst check the decryption of C′:
c′0/H
′(c′1 ·
e(ski′ ·
∏
j∈S′,j =i′ gn+1−j+i′ ,c
′
2)
e(gi′ ,c′3)
)
= c′0/H
′(c′1 · e(gγi′ ·
∏
j∈S′,j =i′ gn+1−j+i′ , g
t)/e(gi′ , (v ·
∏
j∈S′ gn+1−j)
t))
= c′0/H
′(c′1 · e(
∏
j∈S′,j =i′ gn+1−j+i′ , g
t)/e(gi′ ,
∏
j∈S′ g
t
n+1−j))
= c′0/H
′(c′1/e(g, g
t
n+1)) = g
s ·H ′(σ)/H ′(σ · e(g1, gn)t/e(g, gtn+1)) = gs.
Once gs is correctly computed, we can compute the message:
c1 · e(d
′
1·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,c2)
(e(gi,c3)e(gs,c4)e(d′2,c5))
= c1 · e(g
γ
i F1(w)
sF2(h)
s′ ·∏j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,gt)
(e(gi,c3)e(gs,F1(w)t)e(gs
′ ,F2(h)t))
= c1 · e(gγi ·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, g
t)/e(gi, (v ·
∏
j∈S gn+1−j)
t)
= c1 · e(
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i, g
t)/e(gi,
∏
j∈S g
t
n+1−j)
= c1/e(g, gtn+1) = m · e(g1, gn)t/e(g, gtn+1) = m;
Moreover, it is easy to verify the checking equations are correct. Therefore the
correctness of this construction holds.
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4.2 Security
In this scheme, we get the RCCA security from the conversion technique of [7].
The scheme involves one more identity level for hash values. This ensures C
and C′ will not be modiﬁed. We did not check the integrity of the re-encrypted
ciphertext as a whole. but we use Equation 1 and Equation 2 to check the
validity of C, C′, d′1, d
′
2 and their relationships to i, S, w. In Lemma 1, we show
that if all of these equations hold, C will be decrypted to the original message
by d′1, d′2 and gs encrypted in C′. Therefore, the challenger is able to reject
any re-randomization of the re-encrypted ciphertexts or any re-encryption of
the challenge ciphertext.
Lemma 1. If a re-encrypted ciphertext CR = (C,C′, d′1, d
′
2) passes Equation 1
and 2, then CR will be decrypted to the same message as the decryption of C.
Proof. By Equation 1, we know that C is indeed an encryption under the set
S coupling with identity w, C′ is an encryption under the set S′, and i ∈ S.
Then Equation 2 implies that CR will be decrypted to the same message as the
decryption of C, since
c1 · e(d
′
1·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,c2)
e(gi,c3)e(gs,c4)e(d′2,c5)
= c1 · e(d
′
1·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,g
t)
e(gi,c3)e(gs,F1(w)t)e(d′2,F2(h)t)
= c1 · e(
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,g
t)e(d′1,g)
t
e(gi,c3)e(gs,F1(w)t)e(d′2,F2(h)t)
= c1 · e(
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,g
t)e(gi,v)
te(F1(w),g
s)te(F2(h),d
′
2)
t
e(gi,c3)e(gs,F1(w)t)e(d′2,F2(h)t)
(by Equation 2)
= c1 · e(
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,g
t)e(gi,v)
t
e(gi,c3)
= c1 · e(ski·
∏
j∈S,j =i gn+1−j+i,c2)
e(gi,c3)
.

Theorem 3. Suppose the decisional n-BDHE assumption holds and H,H ′ are
two TCR hash functions, the CPBRE scheme for n users described above is
IND-sCond-sSet-RCCA-secure.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A breaking our CPBRE scheme with
non-negligible advantage. Initially, A outputs a selected set S∗ and a selected
condition w∗. Then we construct another algorithm B breaking the underlying
CCA-secure HICBE scheme (CCA-HICBE) as follows.
Given the public key PK of CCA-HICBE, B simulates the RCCA game of
CPBRE. Initially, B prepares the following tables:
– EX with (i): a track of Extract queries.
– RK with columns (i, S′, w, d, C′, gs, br, bq): the records of re-encryption key
(d, C′) returned by B, where C′ ← Encrypt’(PK,S′, gs); br and bq indicate
whether the key is randomly chosen or output by RKExtract oracle.
– RE with column (S′): a track of ReEncrypt(i, S, S′, w∗, C∗) queries, where
i ∈ S∗ and C∗ is the challenge ciphertext.
We use ∗ to denote the wildcard symbol. Note that the intermediate ciphertext
C′ with a diﬀerent form cannot be issued to Decrypt oracle.
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1. Init. B outputs S∗ and w∗ as the target set and identity of CCA-HICBE.
2. Setup. Pick a TCR hash function H ′. B sends PK along with H ′ to A.
3. Query phase 1. B answers the following queries issued by A:
(a) Extract(i): if i ∈ S∗, or (j, S′, w∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, 1) exists in the RK table,
where j ∈ S∗, i ∈ S′, B responds ‘⊥’. Otherwise, B forwards the query
to the key extraction oracle of CCA-HICBE, and responds the received
ski. B records i in the EX table.
(b) RKExtract(i, S′, w): if there is a tuple (i, S′, w, d, C′, gs, ∗, ∗, 1) in the
RK table,B responds (d, C′) toA. Otherwise,B answers the re-encryption
key for the following cases:
– i /∈ S∗ or w = w∗: B queries i’s secret key under identity w from
the challenger of CCA-HICBE, and computes and responds the re-
encryption key (d, C′) as the real scheme (except that gs is given by
the challenger). B records (j, S′, w∗, d, C′, gs, 0, 1) on RK.
– i ∈ S∗, w = w∗ and S′ ∩ EX = ∅: B responds ‘⊥’.
– i ∈ S∗ and w = w∗, but S′ ∩ EX = ∅: if the RK table contains
(i, S′, w, d, C′, gs, 1, 0), B responds (d, C′) to A and sets bq of this
tuple to 1. Otherwise, B responds a random re-encryption key (d, C′),
where d is randomly chosen from G and C′ ← Encrypt’(PK,S′, gs)
for some random s ∈ Zp. B records the tuple (i, S′, w, d, C′, gs, 1, 1)
in the RK table. Note that in this case, any Extract(i′) query for
i′ ∈ S′ is forbidden, so the re-encryption key cannot be veriﬁed.
(c) ReEncrypt(i, S, S′, w, C): B proceeds depending on the following cases:
– i /∈ S∗ or w = w∗: if there is no tuple (i, S′, w, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) on RK, B
performs RKExtract(i, S′, w) to get the re-encryption key (d, C′)
and records (i, S′, w∗, d, C′, gs, 0, 0) on RK. Then B re-encrypts C
using the re-encryption key on RK as in the real scheme.
– i ∈ S∗, w = w∗: if (i, S′, w, ∗, ∗, ∗, 1, 1) exists on RK, B re-encrypts
C using the re-encryption key on RK as in the real scheme. Other-
wise, B issues the key extraction query on (i, (w, h)) to the challenger
of CCA-HICBE where h = H(c1, c2, c3, c4), and gets back the pri-
vate key (d1, d2, d3) = (skiF1(w)sF2(h)s
′
, gs, gs
′
). Then B computes
C′ = Encrypt’(PK,S′, d2) and responds (C,C′, d1, d3). B records
(i, S′, w∗, d, C′, d2, 1, 0) on RK, where d ∈R G.
(d) Decrypt-I(i, S, w,C): B forwards (i, S, w,C) to the decryption oracle
of CCA-HICBE and responds the result to A.
(e) Decrypt-II(i, i′, S, S′, w, CR): let CR = (C,C′, d′1, d
′
2). B issues C′ to
the decryption oracle of CCA-HICBE scheme to obtain gs ﬁrst1. If the
result is ‘⊥’, B responds ‘⊥’ as well. For (i, S′, w), check whether there
1 We cannot issue C′ to the decryption oracle of CCA-HICBE directly. However, we
can modify the CCA-HICBE scheme (removing the ID part and adding the TCR
part) to get a new scheme which encrypts messages as in Encrypt’. The resulting
scheme is like another way of making the BGW [5] scheme CCA-secure using the
conversion technique of [7]. It is easy to show that the obtained scheme is IND-sSet-
CCA secure assuming the decisional n-BDHE assumption and a TCR hash function.
340 C.-K. Chu et al.
exists a tuple (i, S′, w, dˆ, Cˆ, gs, 1, 1) on RK. If there does not exist such
tuple, B decrypts the ciphertext as in the real scheme. Otherwise, check
e(d′1, g)
?= e(dˆ, g)e(F2(h), d′2) and C
′ ?= Cˆ.
If both equations hold, CR is re-encrypted by the random re-encryption
key given by B. So B issues a query (i, S, w,C) to the decryption oracle
of CCA-HICBE and responds the result to A. Otherwise, B decrypts the
ciphertext as in the real scheme.
4. Challenge. A sends (m0,m1) to B. B forwards it to the challenger of CCA-
HICBE. When the challenger returns ciphertext C∗, B responds C∗ to A.
5. Query phase 2. A continues making the following queries as in phase 1, except
for the restrictions described in the deﬁnition.
(a) Extract(i): If i ∈ S′ for some S′ on RE, B responds ‘⊥’. Otherwise, B
responds the queries as in Query phase 1.
(b) RKExtract(i, S′, w): B responds as in Query phase 1.
(c) ReEncrypt(i, S, S′, w, C): If C = C∗, S = S∗, w = w∗, i ∈ S and
S′ ∩ EX = ∅, B responds ‘⊥’. Otherwise, B responds the queries as in
Query phase 1. B records S′ on RE if it did not respond ‘⊥’ and C = C∗.
(d) Decrypt-I(i, S, w,C): If if C = C∗, S = S∗, w = w∗ and i ∈ S, B
responds ‘⊥’. Otherwise, B responds the queries as in Query phase 1.
(e) Decrypt-II(i, i′, S, S′, w, CR): let CR = (C,C′, d′1, d
′
2). B responds the
queries as in Query phase 1 except for the case C = C∗, S = S∗, w = w∗
and i ∈ S. For the latter case, B simply responds with ‘⊥’. We explain
this by considering the following two cases for i ∈ S:
– CR does not pass Equation 1 or 2: B should return ‘⊥’.
– CR passes Equation 1 and 2: by Lemma 1, CR must be decrypted
into mb. According to our security deﬁnition, this query is forbidden.
6. Guess. When A outputs the guess b′, B outputs b′.
A is successfully simulated except for randomly chosen re-encryption keys. For
a randomly chosen re-encryption key (d, C′), there must be a value s′ ∈ Zp such
that d = ski ·F (w)s′ . Therefore the distinguishability of these keys is equivalent
to the distinguishability of C′ and the encryption of some value gs
′
. By the
CCA security of CCA-HICBE and the TCR hash function, this distinguishability
is negligible. Moreover, if A uses a randomly chosen re-encryption key to re-
encrypt a ciphertext and issues it to Decrypt-II oracle, B can make a decryption
query on the original ciphertext and respond with a correct message. So, B has
non-negligible advantage in breaking the CCA-HICBE, and hence breaking the
decisional n-BDHE assumption, by Theorem 1. 
5 RCCA-Secure Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption
Since CPBRE is a generalization of PRE, we can build RCCA-secure IB-PRE
from our RCCA-secure CPBRE by letting the broadcast size be 1 and w be user
ID. We brieﬂy explain the changes here. Details are deferred to the full paper.
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The key generation center executes Setup. For user key generation, each
user gets a 1-level secret key (gγ1F1(id)
s, gs) for his identity id. Everyone has
to encrypt a message under a 2-level identity: recipient’s identity and a dummy
identity t. In RKGen, gs is encrypted under the recipient’s (1-level) identity.
Then a proxy colluding with a third party can only get the decryption key of
delegator’s 2-level identity, which cannot be used to get gs.
In short, a user Alice with the secret key (gγ1F1(“Alice”)
s, gs) delegates the
decryption right to Bob by giving the re-encryption key (gγ1F1(“Alice”)
sF2(t)s
′
,
Encrypt’(PK, “Bob”, gs), gs
′
) to a proxy. The proxy re-encrypts an Alice’s ci-
phertext C in the form (C,C′, d′1, d
′
2). Then Bob can use his own secret key
(gγ1F1(“Bob”)
s′ , gs
′
) to decrypt C′ ﬁrst, and get the decryption of C. The secu-
rity proof is almost the same as that for the RCCA-secure CPBRE scheme.
We say that a PRE scheme is multi-use if the proxy can re-encrypt a ciphertext
multiple times, e.g. re-encrypt from Alice to Bob, then re-encrypt the result from
Bob to Carol. To do that in our construction, the proxy only needs to re-encrypt
C′ to further transform the re-encrypted ciphertext.
6 Conclusions
We introduce conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption, which allows a user to
delegate the decryption rights of ciphertexts to a group of users, restricted to
a certain condition, via the help of a proxy. Our ﬁnal scheme is unidirectional
and secure against replayable chosen-ciphertext attacks in the standard model,
which also gives a unidirectional ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme.
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